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focus is not so much on the outcomes of 
decisions, but rather on the internal pro-
cesses involved—observing what is some-
times referred to as the “black box” of how 
evidence actually informs the policy pro-
cess,[3] within the primary global health 
institution responsible for the production 
of normative guidance to 193 member 
states.[4]
The use of evidence has been a long 
established part of the policy process, and 
within public health, research evidence 
is widely considered as the necessary 
foundation for many health policy deci-
sions.[5] However, many have argued that 
the implied linear process between the 
knowledge produced by researchers and 
the policies developed by policy makers 
oversimplifies and does not adequately 
account for the complexities and political 
nature of policy making.[6]
There is already a substantial body of 
work focused on the use of evidence in 
policy.[5c,7] Many works concerned with 
“uptake” of research findings have attempted to identify ways 
to overcome “barriers” and increase “knowledge transfer”.[8] 
Yet, numerous scholars have also drawn attention to the short-
coming of these approaches, including how they tend to exclude 
political considerations from policy decision making.[6b,9] The 
public health community, it has been argued, has to consider 
how to move beyond simple notions of barriers and facilitators 
or a “more is better” approach.[6b,9] Parkhurst,[6b] for instance, 
argues that a shift is needed to engage with questions of what 
improved evidence use looks like by asking explicitly normative 
questions about how we might judge “good evidence” in terms 
of policy appropriateness, and the “good use of evidence” from 
a perspective of the decision making process. These considera-
tions can then enable reflections on how to improve “evidence 
advisory systems” over time, rather than simply focusing on 
uptake of single pieces of research.[6b]
Scientific advisory committees within technical agencies 
(such as WHO) could be seen in many ways as archetypal 
technocratic agencies within such evidence advisory systems—
made up of experts that are explicitly tasked with review of 
scientific information. In the case of the WHO Global Malaria 
Program (WHO-GMP), the focus of this study, scientific advi-
sory committee members are tasked with reviewing the evi-
dence and advising WHO in their development of global policy 
recommendations to control and eliminate malaria.[10]
This paper presents findings from a case study of two different policy 
development processes within the WHO’s malaria department. By comparing 
the policy processes for the interventions of intermittent preventive treatment 
in infants versus children, the findings suggest that “good evidence”  
from a technical perspective, though important, is not sufficient to ensure  
universal agreement and uptake of recommendations. An analysis of 29 key 
informant interviews finds that evidence also needs to be relevant to the  
policy question being asked, and that expert actors retain a concern over the 
legitimacy of the process by which technical evidence is brought to bear in 
the policy development process. Previous findings from the field of sustain-
able development, that evidence must be credible, salient, and legitimate to 
be accepted by the public, appears to apply equally within scientific advisory 
committees. While the WHO has principally focused on technical criteria for 
evidence inclusion in its policy development processes, this study suggests 
that the design and functionality of its advisory bodies must also enable 
transparent, responsive, and accepted processes of evidence review to ensure 
that these bodies are effective in producing advice that engenders change in 
policy and practice.
Improving Evidence Use
1. Introduction
This paper presents findings from a study investigating 
evidence use in global malaria policy development at the World 
Health Organization (WHO). Past work looking at decision 
making at WHO has engaged with topics such as its criteria 
for guideline development,[1] or critical reflection on the organi-
zation’s response to global health crises.[2] Here, however, the 
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There is also a growing literature providing insights into the 
role and function of scientific advisory committees. Many of 
these are concerned with how to improve their inner workings 
in one way or another, for example by including patient expe-
rience information,[11] or economic information,[12] in order to 
promote the integration of evidence into health policy and prac-
tice. Other literature has been concerned with exploring how 
such bodies deal with constructing or facilitating a process less 
prone to bias, for example by applying clear, comprehensive, 
and consistent evidence inclusion criteria.[13]
What many of these studies have in common is their focus 
on advisory bodies serving national governments. In health 
care, an exemplar often referenced is the National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in England and Wales, 
which serves a mandated role to develop guidelines and make 
decisions that can have direct influence over policy and prac-
tice for the National Health Service. Yet, few studies examine 
the processes and perceptions of global health scientific advi-
sory committees, which advise institutions such as the WHO. 
This may be an important distinction, however, because global 
health governance systems are decidedly different to national 
bodies, given the lack of a supreme authority and much more 
indirect systems of accountability to population groups.
This paper focuses on WHO-GMP, as an example of an inter-
national policy and guidance producer, and presents the findings 
from a case study of two different policy development processes 
for malaria control and prevention that took place within the 
department between 2006 and 2012. Both policies relate to 
what is known within the global malaria community as “inter-
mittent preventive treatment”, or IPT, which is the delivery of 
a treatment dose of an antimalarial drug given at prespecified 
times for the prevention of malaria, regardless of the presence of 
symptoms or confirmed malaria infection. The two policy devel-
opment processes that are compared are for the policies for IPT 
in infants (IPTi) versus in children (IPTc – now known as Sea-
sonal Malaria Chemoprevention or SMC). Although there are 
commonalities between the two policies, the two policy develop-
ment processes that led to them resulted in two very different 
perceptions by stakeholders about the success of those pro-
cesses. For IPTi,[14] the process through which evidence was used 
to inform policy was contentious and considered less than ideal 
to those who were involved.[15] In comparison for SMC,[16] the 
process was viewed by those involved as a model of efficiency.[17]
By comparing the negative perception of one process in rela-
tion to the positive assessment of the other, however, this paper 
aims to explore some of the key features and influences shaping 
the use of evidence to inform policy decisions according to key 
stakeholders who serve within this technical body advising on 
global health guidelines.
2. Data Collection and Analysis
Data for this analysis came from 29 key informants interviewed 
between October 2014 and October 2015. The interviews were 
semi-structured and sampling was purposive to ensure a wide 
range of perspectives from those involved in the IPTi and/or 
SMC policy processes. They included: (a) staff from the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), funders of the IPTi and 
SMC studies; (b) staff from the research institutions who con-
ducted the IPTi and SMC studies; (c) members of two of WHO-
GMP’s scientific advisory committees—the Chemotherapy 
Technical Expert Group (TEG) and the Malaria Policy Advisory 
Committee (MPAC)—who advised WHO-GMP on the IPTi and 
SMC policies; and (d) staff from WHO-GMP responsible for 
issuing the IPTi and SMC policies to relevant member states.
Data also included published and unpublished documentary 
sources, including official policy documents for IPTi and SMC, 
scientific advisory committee meeting reports for IPTi and 
SMC, and internal BMGF and WHO-GMP documents on IPTi 
and SMC. Observational notes documented during meetings 
and conferences between March 2011 and October 2015 were 
also considered, as supplementary to the interview and docu-
ment analysis. Data was organized and analyzed with the use 
of the Nvivo10 software package. Results were analyzed the-
matically, with no strict boundaries between data collection and 
analysis, as some themes began to emerge during the course 
of data collection. The interviews produced multiple narratives, 
which sometimes complemented or contradicted each other, 
but collectively provided insights into evidence use and the 
policy process from the point of view of the participants in it, 
which was the purpose of this interpretive case study.
The broad starting framework for analysis was derived from 
a study by Cash and colleagues,[18] conducted in the field of 
environmental sustainability. The authors found that the effec-
tiveness of science to inform policy rested on three key factors: 
credibility, which refers to the scientific adequacy of the evi-
dence; salience, which refers to the relevance of the science to 
the needs of decision-makers; and legitimacy, which refers to 
the perception that the evidence generation and use has been 
unbiased and fair in its treatment of divergent stakeholder 
interests. Parkhurst,[6b] similarly draws on this work to discuss 
the concepts of “good evidence” for policy or the “good use of 
evidence” within policy processes. “Good evidence” in this work 
is taken to capture evidence which is both appropriate to spe-
cific decisions being made (reflecting salience), but also of high 
quality according to principles of scientific good practice (often 
espoused by champions of so-called evidence based, or evi-
dence informed, policymaking). “The good use of evidence” for 
policy, however, is presented by Parkhurst as capturing multiple 
concepts of legitimacy—including input legitimacy (decisions 
made by authorized representatives of the public); output legiti-
macy (decisions that achieve their intended goals to serve the 
public); and throughput legitimacy (decision processes them-
selves judged legitimate by beneficiaries). These broad concepts 
related to credibility, salience, and legitimacy, then allowed 
exploration of data to consider how similarities and differences 
might be seen between the two policy processes studied—in 
terms of features of the evidence base, its relevance to needs, 
and the process by which the evidence was used.
3. Findings
3.1. A Tale of Two Processes
Malaria is a complex, mosquito-borne, infectious disease, and 
a major global public health problem. In 2015 there were over 
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200 million new cases of malaria and nearly 500 000 deaths.[19] 
An estimated 90% of malaria cases and 92% of malaria deaths 
occur in Africa, the majority among children below five years of 
age.[19] This makes this particular age group in this particular 
geographical location an important target for global health policy 
makers and funders of public health research and programs who 
have a vested interest in reducing the global burden of malaria 
for moral, economic, and global health security reasons.[20]
According to many in the global malaria community, the late 
1990s marked a turning point in global interest in malaria.[21] 
There was a resurgence of international attention for the dis-
ease after what was perceived to be the relative failure of the 
malaria eradication campaign of the 1960s.[21b] Over the fol-
lowing decades, the malaria agenda went from the grand aspi-
ration of eradication to a period of neglect to what is once again 
a recovered and enthusiastic vision of “accelerating toward 
elimination”, which is the goal of WHO’s 2016–2030 global 
strategy for malaria.[20,21b]
The resurgence in attention was accompanied by a huge rise 
in the funds available for malaria research, control, as well as 
advocacy. This is reflected in the creation of Multilateral Initia-
tive on Malaria in 1997, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership in 
1998, BMGF in 1999, and the Global Fund against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2001.[22] The increase in funding, 
particularly from the BMGF,[23] provided new opportunities for 
research for increasing numbers of researchers, and it led to 
greater discussion among researchers around how few inter-
ventions against malaria existed.[24] At the end of the 1990s 
there were limited tools for malaria treatment and control, but 
that would soon change.[21b]
In 2001, the results of a randomized controlled trial (RCT) 
in Tanzania using Intermittent Preventive Treatment in 
infants (IPTi) employing the antimalarial drug Sulphadoxine–
Pyrimethamine, delivered through the Expanded Program on 
Immunization, showed that this could be a useful intervention 
as it reduced clinical malaria episodes in infants by 59%.[25] 
This generated much enthusiasm among the core group of sci-
entists involved in the trial, and subsequently in the medical 
profession,[26] because the results were considered potentially 
game-changing compared to the 35% pooled protective efficacy 
of malaria prevention interventions in pregnancy, i.e., Intermit-
tent Preventive Treatment in pregnant women (IPTp) and insec-
ticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs).[27] The researchers involved 
along with researchers from other institutions, and staff at 
WHO and UNICEF, subsequently formed a cross-institu-
tional BMGF-funded global research partnership in 2003—the 
IPTi Consortium—that declared that they had “developed a 
research and implementation agenda that will rapidly resolve 
the outstanding scientific questions about this innovative form 
of malaria control, and move the intervention into policy and 
practice” within five years, by the end of 2008.[28] They also 
added, somewhat ambitiously, that they had “prepared a stra-
tegic plan showing how, by the end of 2005, sufficient informa-
tion will exist on which to base a policy recommendation.”[28]
As part of the strategic plan and policy goals of the IPTi 
Consortium, a concurrent Policy Platform was established in 
WHO-GMP in 2005 to review the evidence gathered through 
the Consortium’s research groups.[29] Its role was to prepare 
evidence as it became available from the IPTi studies for a 
WHO technical review, so that WHO-GMP could reach a global 
recommendation on IPTi. This technical review involved the 
assessment of evidence by a series of WHO scientific advisory 
committees—a TEG, a Technical and Research Advisory Com-
mittee (TRAC) that reviewed TEG recommendations, and a 
Strategic and Technical Advisory Group (STAG) that reviewed 
TRAC recommendations.
For IPTi, the first TEG meeting was held in October 2006 and 
assessed the results of 11 studies on the efficacy and safety of 
IPTi in infants and children.[30] At the time of the 2006 review, 
three of the trials on efficacy and safety were not published. The 
recommendation of the 2006 TEG to WHO was for countries 
to implement IPTi alongside rigorous monitoring, and if as 
additional data on IPTi emerged, there would be further assess-
ments of the intervention. This TEG recommendation went to 
the TRAC in December 2006 where it was endorsed. The final 
level of review, before going to the WHO Director General, 
was at the STAG due to be held in May 2007. However, WHO 
cancelled this meeting and decided that a second TEG should 
be convened. This decision was triggered by newly available 
results of the outstanding trials released early in 2007, which 
reported the occurrence of severe adverse reactions that had 
not been reported in previous trials. In October 2007 a second 
meeting of the TEG took place, recognizing IPTi was a “prom-
ising intervention” but they recanted their previous recommen-
dation and, to be cautious, suggested another review be held 
in 2008 when new data became available.[31] The deliberations 
of the TEG were negatively perceived by some IPTi researchers 
as unnecessary delays in the evidence advisory process, and led 
to increasing frustration within the IPTi Consortium.[15] This 
led to increasing tensions both amongst the researchers, and 
with WHO-GMP and its TEG, over differences in perceptions 
of time urgency, the meaning of rigorous evidence review, 
and the role of scientists.[15] In an attempt to drive what was 
perceived to be a circular and slow moving process forward, 
the BMGF decided to commission an independent study 
from the U.S. Institute of Medicine (IoM) in mid-2007 to eval-
uate the IPTi results. This process, however, was viewed by 
multiple individuals interviewed as being at best irritating and 
at worse undermining to WHO-GMP. In July 2008, the IoM 
review concluded that IPTi was “worthy of further investment” 
and was potentially “ready to move to a new level,” implying 
program implementation in countries where IPTi would be 
effective.[32] It is difficult to say whether the 2008 IoM conclu-
sion had any bearing on WHO-GMP (interviewees suggested it 
did not) but in April 2009, eight years after the first IPTi study 
was published, a final meeting of the TEG judged the IPTi evi-
dence base to finally be sufficiently acceptable, and endorsed 
a global policy recommendation on IPTi by WHO to member 
states.[33]
The political fall-out from the perceived delays and tensions 
in the IPTi policy process was among the factors that precipi-
tated WHO-GMP to review its many existing policy setting 
mechanisms in what by that point was an increasingly com-
petitive global health policy environment for WHO-GMP.[34] 
Specifically, in 2011, WHO-GMP embarked on a policy setting 
strengthening exercise to increase the timeliness, transparency, 
independence, and relevance of its recommendations to WHO 
member states in relation to malaria control and elimination.[35] 
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The result was the scientific advisory committee, MPAC, first 
convened in 2012, to provide “independent strategic advice 
and technical input to the WHO for the development of policy 
recommendations covering all aspects of malaria control and 
elimination.”[35]
The first body of evidence to come under this new system 
of MPAC review was for SMC. SMC is defined as the intermit-
tent administration (once a month, up to four months) of full 
treatment courses of an antimalarial medicine (Amodiaquine + 
Sulphadoxine–Pyrimethamine) to children under the age of five 
during the malaria season to prevent malarial illness by main-
taining therapeutic antimalarial drug concentrations in the 
blood throughout the period of greatest malarial risk.[16]
Research on SMC had been going on for several years before 
the MPAC was formed. As in the case of IPTi, enthusiasm for 
SMC was based on positive findings from a RCT, but in Sen-
egal instead of Tanzania, also published in the Lancet, but in 
2006 instead of 2001, in this case showing an even higher 86% 
protective efficacy, compared to the 59% protective efficacy of 
the first IPTi RCT.[25,36] More notably, however, unlike with the 
previous case, an official consortium with an overt agenda to 
achieve policy goals was never formed, and there appeared 
to be little tension between actors involved in the evidence 
advisory process. Instead, a series of informal collaborative 
meetings between SMC researchers and WHO with relevant 
national policy makers and program managers to identify out-
standing priorities for research relevant to a SMC policy deci-
sion took place in 2008.[37] These were followed by several 
large-scale evaluation studies in 2009.[38] Meanwhile, there were 
periodic informal reviews of the evidence dossier by experts to 
ensure that the necessary information was being collated for 
an informed decision by policy makers.[37] This culminated 
in a single formal meeting of the TEG to review the evidence 
for SMC in May 2011, which resulted in a unanimous positive 
recommendation for the intervention despite the lack of an 
implementation mechanism.[39] The recommendation was 
reviewed by the newly formed MPAC in February 2012, and 
by March, six years after the first SMC study was published, 
WHO-GMP issued the policy recommendation for SMC.[16]
Although the overall timeline between initial results publi-
cation to an eventual policy recommendation by WHO-GMP 
had some similarities for both IPTi and SMC (Figure 1), as 
described earlier, many stakeholders viewed the policy develop-
ment process for SMC as considerably better—a “model” pro-
cess[17]—to that for IPTi. The reasons for why appear to relate to 
both features of the evidence itself as well as perceptions of the 
policy process, explored next.
3.2. Strength and Quality of Evidence (Credibility)
Although there were several questions about the efficacy 
of IPTi (such as the extent to which IPTi merely delayed the 
onset of malaria and how much that mattered, or the impact of 
increasing drug resistance to Sulphadoxine–Pyrimethamine in 
parts of East Africa), the main criticism of several interviewees 
regarding the nature of the evidence was that the positive 
results from the first IPTi trial were not reproduced to the same 
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high levels in later trials—the pooled protective efficacy of IPTi 
was 30%,[14] compared to the 59% protective efficacy from the 
first trial,[25] which is to say that IPTi trials subsequent to the 
first one showed much lower protective efficacy on average. For 
some, this raised questions about the benefits of IPTi:
One of the big issues with IPTi was that the evidence didn’t all 
point in the same direction. So the decisions were, you know, I 
think it was harder for people to have the level of confidence in 
them that they might have had with SMC where there’s not much 
evidence going in the other directions. – KI41
Heterogeneity was not an issue for the SMC set of studies, 
where the pooled protective efficacy of the intervention was 
75%,[40] compared to the 86% protective efficacy from the first 
trial,[36] which is to say that all SMC trial results showed simi-
larity with consistently high protective efficacy.[39,40]
Many interviewees seemed to assume this consistency 
between SMC trial results reflected strength of the results, 
which in turn might have helped the evidence base for SMC 
appear of higher quality compared to IPTi. However, the incon-
sistency in IPTi trial results is not necessarily a sign of weak-
ness or lower quality, as the difference can be due to features 
of the study environments. The SMC studies all took place 
within a narrow geographic band of West Africa with similar 
and highly seasonal transmission (60% of cases occurring 
within four months of the year). In contrast, IPTi trials took 
place all over sub-Saharan Africa in a variety of transmission 
and epidemiological settings (which is common for many 
malaria interventions). Therefore, it would have been expected 
that any given trial would show higher protective efficacy, and 
greater consistency, when tested in more narrow trial regions 
(although the absolute level would depend of course on features 
of the intervention, including the drugs used).
In addition, the protective efficacy of IPTi is not dissimilar to 
other preventative malaria interventions widely recommended; 
for example, the best known preventive intervention against 
malaria, ITNs, has a protective efficacy of 55% in children.[27] 
The complexity of preventing a complicated disease in a wide 
variety of (and ever-changing) epidemiological settings is the 
reason no “magic bullet” exists in malaria control and why high 
coverage of a mix of interventions that is most suited to local 
transmission patterns is recommended by WHO.[20] So when it 
comes to protective efficacy as a proxy measure of the strength 
of an evidence base, it could be said that SMC is more of an 
outlier for preventive malaria interventions, given its consist-
ency but also relatedly, the narrow geographic focus of studies. 
When thinking about the IPTi case in retrospect, many inter-
viewees conceded this point, but opened up as to other reasons 
why they found the SMC evidence base to be relatively stronger 
and more credible.
3.3. Policy Relevance (Salience)
The perception of higher “strength” for SMC might have been 
compounded by the fact that the SMC study sites in the inter-
vention region of Africa were also the proposed implementation 
sites for the SMC policy, which resulted in an unusual situation 
for the scientific advisory committees (TEG and MPAC) that 
systematically reviewed the evidence base on SMC in order to 
advise WHO-GMP on a policy recommendation. In many other 
cases, these bodies need to deliberate about the applicability of 
study findings from a wide range of settings to the target con-
texts. Yet with SMC, because the study region was the imple-
mentation region, the evidence base reviewed had both high 
internal and external validity, which as several interviewees 
pointed out, made making a positive policy recommendation 
an easy choice and a relatively straightforward process com-
pared to IPTi. Whereas in comparison the TEG for IPTi (MPAC 
did not exist at the time) had far more nuances to consider in 
its systematic review of the evidence available at the time.[41]
For example, IPTi was sometimes described as “the wrong 
drug… at the wrong time,”[42] even though in reality, the pro-
grammatic feasibility (implementation) of IPTi was recog-
nized as being extremely important by the IPTi Consortium.[43] 
Unfortunately, this did not appear to be enough. WHO-GMP 
and some other interviewees were uncertain as to how IPTi 
could be implemented and monitored in view of the increasing 
drug resistance to Sulphadoxine–Pyrimethamine in some parts 
of Africa and the lack of capacity in some countries, particu-
larly at district level, to monitor levels of drug resistance in 
order to know where best to target the drug (making the drug 
essentially ineffective in those areas, hence the view that it 
might be the “wrong drug”). In addition, the actual relevance 
of IPTi was also questioned in countries where the coverage 
of its delivery mechanism, the Expanded Program on Immu-
nization, was low, or where there was highly seasonal malaria 
transmission (which is to say the delivery of the drug would 
not in some areas of countries be coinciding with the expected 
peaks in the number of malaria cases, hence the view that it 
might be delivered at the “wrong time”), as IPTi would have 
a very small effect.[44] Although these issues were not specific 
to IPTi, WHO guidelines had to take into account local hetero-
geneity of countries’ epidemiological profiles and the need to 
disaggregate their policy to sub-national levels. This was less of 
an issue for the SMC policy consideration, as there was epide-
miological homogeneity for the reasons described earlier, and 
because the policy would only apply to certain parts of certain 
countries where 60% of cases occurred within four months of 
the year, the policy in some ways was already disaggregated to 
sub-national levels.
SMC, in comparison to IPTi, was also described as having 
higher “practicability” and “generalizability” beyond just a 
research setting. This also seemed to contribute to its evidence 
base’s perceived “strength” and salience. As one member of 
MPAC described:
I think the evidence base for SMC is pretty strong. I mean there are 
a number of really quite convincing and sufficiently large studies 
that show major impact. I mean you’re always concerned with, I 
think, a number of things; one is the size of the studies, the con-
sistency of the results, and the scale of impact, and that’s the first 
step. Obviously you’re then concerned about the practicability, be-
cause there it’s quite possible to have an intervention, which is in a 
controlled setting, demonstrably effective, but it may simply not be 
practical. I think SMC has the advantage of firstly, it’s got a good 
evidence base; the studies [have] sufficient numbers, are sufficiently 
large, and showing really major impact, and certainly some of the 
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studies have been conducted under conditions which would allow 
you to already extend it to the idea that this could be applied in a 
[real-life] setting rather than a small-scale research study. – KI34
The reasons for the difference in generalizability are varied, 
and among the explanations that were offered by interviewees 
was the difference in age group and banding (infants versus 
children), and the study location (highly seasonal transmission 
versus a variety of transmission settings). The SMC studies 
were focused only in areas of highly seasonal transmission 
whereas the goal of the IPTi studies was to be generalizable 
to all of Sub Saharan Africa, which has far more variability 
in malaria transmission, sometimes within the same country. 
This, in hindsight, made generalizability difficult due to the 
variability in results, compared to the relative homogeneity of 
the SMC study results due to the homogeneous transmission 
settings.
In short, by conducting the SMC RCTs in the countries 
where the intervention, if successful, would be eventually 
rolled out, SMC researchers helped ensure that their portfolio 
of research answered a wide enough range of useful questions 
to policy makers that it was considered more relevant com-
pared with IPTi. This is despite SMC having some perceived 
implementation-related weaknesses such as no single pre-
existing delivery mechanism. For example, IPTi delivery via 
the Expanded Program on Immunization was viewed by many 
as a potential strength, as it meant delivery would be through 
the existing health system, when most mothers were already 
visiting health clinics with their infants for their WHO-recom-
mended vaccination schedule. Some interviewees, however, 
perceived the lack of a single pre-existing delivery mechanism 
as a potential strength for SMC, rather than a critical weakness, 
as to them it meant that national malaria control programs 
could have more flexibility and control over how the interven-
tion could best be delivered in their local context.
3.4. Legitimacy of the Process
A final theme explored was features related to the perceived 
legitimacy of the two processes, and how this may help to 
explain why interviewees saw the SMC process as better than 
that for IPTi. At the time of the IPTi Consortium, the evidence 
review process at WHO-GMP involved the assessment of evi-
dence by a series of scientific advisory committees—the TEG, 
TRAC, and STAG.[34] By the time of evidence review for the 
SMC studies in 2011, however, a restructure intended to make 
the policy process more “transparent, responsive, and cred-
ible,”[35] meant there were two levels, the TEG and the MPAC, 
which the TEG reported to. Beyond this, however, two further 
sub-themes emerged related to the legitimacy of the processes.
3.4.1. A Difference in Expectations and Framing
One difference between the policy processes for SMC and IPTi 
was in the researchers’ expectations of the policy process. As 
mentioned previously, in the IPTi Consortium funding pro-
posal approved by the BMGF in 2003, the researchers had high 
expectations that results would be consistent, and knowledge 
transfer would be quick. Policy engagement was planned to take 
place alongside the process of generating evidence on IPTi. A 
strategy was devised which set out a clear schedule that in 2006, 
that is to say at the time of the first TEG meeting, the Consor-
tium would have generated a substantive body of evidence on 
IPTi to inform a WHO policy recommendation in that year. By 
framing the value of their research and their own success as a 
Consortium around a quick policy recommendation by WHO, 
the IPTi Consortium put themselves, and by extension, the 
WHO-GMP evidence advisory process, under significant pres-
sure. One interviewee recalled:
Now where the IPTi consortium went wrong was that there was 
this day which was called the “green line” where we all go to it with 
all our evidence, and then the policy decision to implement IPTi 
would be made, but of course the reality is that the evidence would 
be considered and then a decision for IPTi policy would be made. 
But it wasn’t really figured out like that. It was figured out that the 
“green line” meant green for go, and IPTi would be recommended, 
and IPTi would be implemented. And I think that that was really 
the biggest error, [the] supposition that the data would support a 
decision to go ahead. – KI44
Although similar policy engagement also took place along-
side the process of generating evidence on SMC, that process 
was perceived to be more organic, for example, via informal (by 
WHO standards) meetings between SMC researchers, WHO, 
and national malaria programs in 2008. The SMC researchers 
were not part of a formal “SMC Consortium” with an overt 
agenda to achieve policy goals. One reason for this is that they 
might have learned lessons from observing the experience of 
global malaria colleagues in the IPTi Consortium, who were in 
the midst of repeated TEG reviews and tensions with WHO-
GMP at around the same time. In any case, SMC researchers 
did not appear to have high expectations of quick knowledge 
transfer, nor the pressure of self-imposed “green lines” to con-
tend with, which might have contributed to a less fraught policy 
process with relatively tempered expectations, despite consist-
ently highly efficacious trial results.
3.4.2. Conflicting Agendas
The IPTi Consortium was made up of actors from different 
institutions with different primary objectives ranging from a 
focus on science to a concern with delivering programs. One 
thing they did have in common was high expectations that 
IPTi knowledge transfer would be quick and uncomplicated.[28] 
Unfortunately, perceptions of the IPTi Consortium and views of 
it having an overt agenda, appeared to affect the functioning of 
the advisory bodies involved. This led to the perception of two 
sides pitted against the other. One interviewee summarized:
It was bad. Aggressive from some of the researchers, aggressive 
from some members of the BMGF, an aggressive push back from 
WHO, I’ve never seen anything like it before. Everyone seemed to 
rally on the two sides. –KI49
There was also a tension within the research community. 
Some IPTi Consortium members were strongly committed to 
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contributing to public health by clear engagement in the policy 
process. Others felt, however, that scientists had to stay neutral 
and research-focused. Although these tensions were less of an 
issue within the SMC policy process, many SMC researchers 
also expressed similar views about the role of researchers:
You try to make sure that the key people know about [your study 
results] and that’s by having a meeting or a symposium. Taking 
that any further, I’ve always been on the side that investigators 
shouldn’t become lobbyists, and that somebody else should do that. 
You may need a lobbyist, but those are different people, it shouldn’t 
be the investigators who did the trials…they may be asked to help, 
but you shouldn’t have one of the key investigators initiating that 
process. – KI29
The perceived overt advocacy by some IPTi Consortium 
members may have contributed to undermining their legiti-
macy within the IPTi policy development process. This was 
a consistent reflection across the various groups of inter-
viewees—funder, researcher, and WHO staff. One interviewee 
shared their perception of the tension between WHO-GMP and 
the IPTi Consortium from that time:
I think clearly a problem [was] that WHO perceived the IPTi 
Consortium as being a mixture of investigators and advocates, 
and without a clear separation of those. So they saw this group as 
putting evidence forward and advocating strongly for implementa-
tion, for adoption of policy and implementation of IPTi. In fact, 
I think, in some ways the Consortium was perceived more as ad-
vocates than as sort of independent, unbiased investigators and so 
that colors the way things are looked at. If you think these people 
are flogging something and they’ve got lots of biases, then surely 
their data is biased and they’re not revealing … For example, 
they may not have done the studies well enough to be sure that 
there aren’t adverse reactions. That was a big issue. You could ask 
“Really? Did you really set things up so you picked up the 
signals?” – KI23
In comparison, the researchers who were part of the SMC 
studies were perceived to have played a more neutral role, 
which was seen to help maintain their legitimacy. For example, 
one interviewee reflected:
Many people, including myself, perceived and liked that the [SMC 
researchers] behaved the way that you expect scientists should be-
have…they really saw the various sides and carefully looked at the 
various angles [of the research question]. –KI35
Reflections like these were common; the lack of pressure 
and, as a result, conflict during the SMC policy development 
process was considered by many interviewees to be its positive 
defining feature, in contrast with IPTi and its seeming legiti-
macy undermining missteps.
A big perceived misstep was the creation of the IPTi Policy 
Platform, which was part of both the Consortium and WHO-
GMP.[29] Many interviewees felt that WHO-GMP should never 
have been part of the IPTi Consortium or home to its Policy 
Platform, as it was a conflict of interest and detracted from the 
legitimacy of the process and the independent “balancing act” 
that is a WHO policy recommendation. One interviewee shared 
what they perceived to be a valuable lesson learned:
There was one WHO staff member who was put on the IPTi pro-
posal as part of the Consortium. Later on, this wound up raising 
questions about whether one should have someone as part of a 
consortium who is part of the institution that will be judge and 
jury of the evidence being generated. Does that blur those lines too 
much? I have to say that I have probably changed my view of 
that over time. I remember at the time being indignant that how 
could WHO have agreed to be part of the consortium, and then 
later reversing its position and claiming that it was not right for 
WHO to play that role. Now that I have spent time at WHO, and 
understand the importance of the independence of that evidence 
making process, I now understand those concerns. And I think 
that it probably is not a good idea to have someone as part of a 
consortium who is part of the agency that is convening the evidence 
review process; some separation is necessary. It doesn’t need to be 
a firewall. There can be a dialogue, but you can’t have that person 
be part of the group. They need to be having regular exchanges 
with the group and helping to steer the sort of evidence base that’s 
required, but not be implicated as part of that group. I think that 
is an important balancing act. –KI39
Having an overt policy agenda was not a mistake repeated 
by the researchers for the SMC set of studies. In addition, here 
WHO-GMP involvement was viewed positively; they were seen 
as a “hands on” partner, meeting again for informal consulta-
tions between 2009 and 2010 when SMC researchers were col-
lectively preparing their dossier for evidence review by the TEG. 
This was not perceived to be a conflict of interest by WHO-
GMP. It was seen to be in everyone’s interest to make the pro-
cess smooth while still maintaining institutional integrity via 
independence and transparency. Having a clear and transparent 
evidence review process for SMC appeared to be quite impor-
tant to many interviewees. One interviewee recalled:
For IPTI, it did not seem like a clear process; it seemed a bit cloak 
and dagger, or that events were taking place in a smoky dark room. 
There was no transparency as to how the process was supposed to be 
conducted. For the review of SMC, the fact that the Malaria Policy 
Advisory Committee had been convened in a transparent way, that 
everyone was aware who was on it, that there was clear terms of ref-
erence for the committee, that the Director General had signed off 
on the process, I think gave a lot of credibility in advance to the pro-
cess, which is really important. If people coming into an evidence 
review have no idea what to expect, no idea what the steps are 
going to be, no idea who ultimately is making those decisions, then 
I think the process is on the rocks before it even gets going. – KI44
During the SMC policy development process, WHO-GMP 
was able to fulfill its own ideal notion of structural and legitimate 
power, without having to defend itself against other actors as it 
felt pressured to do during the IPTi process. By maintaining its 
power during the SMC process, WHO-GMP maintained its legit-
imacy as a global health policy actor, which might have helped 
maintain the legitimacy of the policy development process itself.
4. Discussion
Explaining the differences in the policy development pro-
cesses between IPTi and SMC requires understanding a set 
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of interacting factors related to features of the evidence base 
as well as features of the process by which it was brought to 
bear on policymaking. IPTi was introduced as an innovation 
that was pursued by a group of committed public health prac-
titioners and researchers, and internally framed along the lines 
of a quick and linear process. The IPTi Consortium’s proposal 
to BMGF included a clear schedule and a Policy Platform to 
facilitate the policy development process. Consortium members 
believed that more evidence delivered in a timely way would 
persuade policymakers to recommend IPTi. However, over 
time, this internal expectation and pressure to meet the dead-
lines they had set for themselves in their proposal to BMGF led 
to a breakdown in consensus and trust between actors, followed 
by delays in its policy development. In comparison, the SMC 
policy process was never viewed as a battle between the actors 
involved. Here the policy process was viewed as open, inclusive, 
and transparent, which was WHO-GMP’s intention of what a 
good policy process should look like when it formed MPAC.[35] 
By learning from its experience with IPTi, and optimizing the 
design and function of its principal scientific advisory com-
mittee to better serve its institutional needs, WHO-GMP was 
perceived as having strengthened its malaria policy develop-
ment process.
What appears to have edged the SMC evidence base over the 
one for IPTi was that, ultimately, it was more relevant to the 
question being asked by the TEG, with its perceived value as 
an intervention being boosted by the size and potential impact 
of its protective efficacy, and the high consistency of the results 
across RCT sites. Although the reasons for this difference (the 
highly focused and similar transmission settings for SMC 
studies) can be explained, a pooled protective efficacy of 75% 
for SMC compared to 30% for IPTi made the potential impact 
of SMC a difficult policy option to ignore. In other words, while 
the results of the RCTs for IPTi would be considered “credible” 
by standard evidence hierarchy measures, and comparable to 
other preventive malaria interventions, the evidence base for 
SMC compared to IPTi was perceived to be both “credible” and 
“salient”, which contributed to making it appear better, or more 
appropriate for policy consideration.
The study findings also suggest that the breakdown in con-
sensus and trust in the policy process, due to the different 
expectations, conflicting agendas, and in some instances, the 
overt advocacy of the actors involved, might have contributed to 
the perception of problems that undermined the policy develop-
ment process for IPTi, in comparison to SMC. The contestation 
around the IPTi policy process might have contributed to nega-
tive perceptions of its policy value. Contestation, as a form of 
deliberation and consensus building, is not necessarily a “bad” 
thing, particularly when built into institutional arrangements 
that aim to improve the legitimacy of governing processes 
through deliberation and inclusion of multiple views.[45] Some 
scholars have seen the need for deliberation as particularly 
important when public policy relies on delegation to scientific 
experts that serve to provide scientific advice.[46] Institutional 
approaches in the policy sciences recognize that institutions 
can be thought of in terms of formal structures, and also as 
rules that shape how decisions are made.[47] In the case of 
SMC, although there was not necessarily as much deliberation 
over the evidence as there was for IPTi, it appears that having 
clear expectations from all sides of the evidence advisory pro-
cess, with a clear structure and terms of reference for MPAC 
members, as well as transparency of the evidence considera-
tion, might have led to the process for SMC appearing more 
“legitimate” to those involved in it evidence advice and policy 
development.
These findings are not meant to imply that one evidence 
base was stronger or weaker than the other was, or that the 
process of evidence use is necessarily more important than fea-
tures of the evidence itself. Indeed, both feature in important 
but differing ways. As such, these findings help to reinforce 
how the factors of credibility, salience, and legitimacy all 
appear to influence evidence use, with particular insights into 
an agency with a particular technical remit and expert body of 
stakeholders informing global health policy making.
While these findings emerge from a pair of specific malaria 
policy developments, there may be reasons to believe similar 
issues would be relevant elsewhere. Indeed, the issues of credi-
bility, salience, and legitimacy derived from a very different 
study conducted on sustainable development related to con-
cerns of the lay public as well as of scientists. Thus seeing sim-
ilar issues arise in a technical body made up of individuals with 
broadly similar scientific training helps to illustrate that even 
in these groups, features outside scientific quality can matter 
when it comes to evidence use for policy and planning.
What might be an important additional factor for WHO how-
ever, as it continues to improve its internal guideline develop-
ment processes,[4] is to consider more specifically the processes 
followed by its advisory bodies, in addition to concern over how 
to judge or rank evidence. Specifically considering how to build 
evidence advisory structures that are open, inclusive, and trans-
parent might serve to promote the legitimacy of its policy deci-
sions and decrease potential conflicts of interests in a global 
health-funding environment where private funders are viewed 
as having increasing influence on the global health agenda.[48] 
For example, the BMGF are already one of the largest donors 
to the WHO, and within the field of global malaria, they funded 
both the IPTi Consortium and many of the SMC studies, in 
addition to the policy-strengthening grant that led to the crea-
tion of MPAC.[28,35,37,48f,49] There is very little in the world of 
global malaria control and elimination that is not funded or at 
least influenced by BMGF.[50] While many in the global malaria 
community are quick to point out the positive outcomes of what 
funding coming from the BMGF can achieve,[48e] the findings 
here illustrate the importance of process legitimacy in addition 
to concern over outputs and outcomes.
5. Conclusion
In the case of the policy development processes for IPTi and 
SMC, the findings show that “good evidence” from a purely 
technical (credibility) perspective was not sufficient to ensure 
universal agreement and uptake of recommendations, even 
within a highly technocratic body such as the WHO-GMP. 
The findings suggest that evidence also needed to be relevant 
(salient) to the policy question being asked, and technical 
actors retained a concern over the legitimacy of the process 
by which technical evidence was brought to bear in the policy 
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development process. Cash and colleagues findings from the 
field of sustainable development,[18] that evidence must be 
credible, salient, and legitimate to be accepted by the public, 
appears to equally apply within scientific advisory committees, 
albeit nuanced by their specific contextual realities.
While the WHO has principally focused on technical criteria 
for evidence inclusion in its policy and guideline development 
processes, the study of the MPAC suggests that the design and 
functionality of its scientific advisory committees might also have 
a role to play within its overarching evidence advisory system. Sci-
entific advisory committees should consider enabling transparent, 
responsive, and credible processes of evidence review, to ensure 
that they are effective in producing advice that ultimately leads 
to policy recommendations by WHO. Such legitimacy may also 
be important to implementation of recommendations by WHO 
member states, particularly considering the current funding envi-
ronment in which WHO is highly reliant on external sources 
of funding, both for programmatic work, as well as for funding 
research that aims to ultimately inform policy and practice.
Acknowledgements
B.J.D. and J.O.P. conceived the idea for the article. B.J.D. wrote the first 
draft—a summary of her DrPH thesis, supervised by J.O.P.—which was 
reviewed by J.O.P. Both authors contributed to the final manuscript, 
and wish to thank all those who participated in the research, those 
who reviewed the article, and the Global Strategy Lab for their interest 
in including it in the Global Challenges special issue on optimizing 
scientific advisory committees.
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Keywords
evidence, governance, legitimacy, policy process, WHO
Received: August 29, 2017
Revised: November 13, 2017
Published online: March 22, 2018
[1] a) B. U. Burda, A. R. Chambers, J. C. Johnson, Public Health 2014, 
128, 444; b) A. D. Oxman, J. N. Lavis, A. Fretheim, Lancet 2007, 
369, 1883.
[2] a) R. Horton, Lancet 2006, 367, 1793; b) P. Piot, Science 2014, 345, 
1221; c) S. Abeysinghe, Pandemics, Science and Policy: H1N1 and 
the World Health Organisation, Palgrave Macmillan, UK 2015.
[3] T. A. Birkland, An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts 
and Models of Public Policy Making, Routledge, UK 2014.
[4] WHO, WHO Handbook for Guideline Development, http://apps.
who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/75146/1/9789241548441_eng.
pdf?ua=1 (accessed: September 2016).
[5] a) J. N. Lavis, M. G. Wilson, A. D. Oxman, J. Grimshaw, S. Lewin, 
A. Fretheim, Health Res. Policy Syst. 2009, 7 Suppl 1, S5; b) 
J. Lomas, A. D. Brown, Milbank Q 2009, 87, 903; c) S. M. Nutley, 
I. Walter, H. T. O. Davies, Using Evidence How Research can 
Inform Public Services, Policy Press at the University of Bristol, UK  
2007.
[6] a) T. Greenhalgh, S. Wieringa, J. R. Soc. Med. 2011, 104, 501; 
b) J. O. Parkhurst, The Politics of Evidence: From Evidence Based 
Policy to the Good Governance of Evidence, Routledge, UK 2016.
[7] V. Lin, B. Gibson, Evidence-based Health Policy: Problems & 
Possibilities, Oxford University Press, Melbourne 2003.
[8] a) D. Contandriopoulos, M. Lemire, J. L. Denis, E. Tremblay, 
Milbank Q 2010, 88, 444; b) C. A. Estabrooks, D. S. Thompson, 
J. J. Lovely, A. Hofmeyer, J. Contin. Educ. Health Prof. 2006, 26, 
25; c) S. Innvaer, G. Vist, M. Trommald, A. Oxman, J. Health Serv. 
Res. Policy 2002, 7, 239; d) C. Mitton, C. E. Adair, E. McKenzie, 
S. B. Patten, B. Waye Perry, Milbank Q 2007, 85, 729; e) K. Oliver, 
S. Innvar, T. Lorenc, J. Woodman, J. Thomas, BMC Health Serv. Res. 
2014, 14, 2.
[9] a) P. Cairney, The Politics of Evidence-based Policymaking, Palgrave 
Pivot, London 2015; b) K. Oliver, T. Lorenc, S. Innvaer, Health Res. 
Policy Syst. 2014, 12, 34; c) K. Smith, Beyond Evidence based Policy in 
Public Health: The Interplay of Ideas, Palgrave Macmillan, UK 2013.
[10] WHO, WHO MPAC Terms of Reference, http://www.who.int/
malaria/publications/atoz/tor_malaria_policy_advisory_committee.
pdf?ua=1 (accessed: September 2017).
[11] B. Campbell, E. Chambers, M. Kelson, S. Bennett, G. Lyratzopoulos, 
Qual. Saf. Health Care 2010, 19, e28.
[12] a) O. Eddama, J. Coast, Health Policy 2009, 89, 261; b) I. Williams, 
S. Bryan, S. McIver, J. Health Serv. Res. Policy 2007, 12, 73.
[13] M. Schlander, Current Medical Research and Opinion, 2008, 24, 515.
[14] WHO, Intermittent preventive treatment during infancy with sulphad-
oxine-pyrimethamine (IPTi-SP) for Plasmodium falciparum malaria 
control in Africa (2010), http://www.who.int/malaria/publica-
tions/atoz/policy_recommendation_IPTi_032010/en/ (accessed: 
March 2016).
[15] V. O. Cruz, G. Walt, Health Policy Plan 2013, 28, 616.
[16] WHO, Seasonal malaria chemoprevention for Plasmodium falciparum 
malaria control in highly seasonal transmission areas of the Sahel sub-
region in Africa (2012), http://www.who.int/malaria/publications/
atoz/who_smc_policy_recommendation/en/ (accessed: March 
2016).
[17] LSHTM, Developing a new approach to malaria prevention in children: 
seasonal malaria chemoprevention in West Africa (2014), https://
www.lshtm.ac.uk/research/research-action/impact-case-studies/
seasonal-malaria-chemoprevention, (accessed: March 2016).
[18] D. W. Cash, W. C. Clark, F. Alcock, N. M. Dickson, N. Eckley, 
D. H. Guston, J. Jager, R. B. Mitchell, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 
2003, 100, 8086.
[19] WHO, World malaria report 2016, http://www.who.int/malaria/ 
publications/world-malaria-report-2016/en/ (accessed: June, 2017).
[20] WHO, Global technical strategy for malaria 2016-2030, http://www.
who.int/malaria/areas/global_technical_strategy/en/ (accessed: 
March, 2016).
[21] a) B. Greenwood, T. Mutabingwa, Nature 2002, 415, 670; 
b) R. M. Packard, The Making of a Tropical Disease: A Short History of 
Malaria, JHU Press, USA 2007; c) S. Litsios, The Contextual Determi-
nants of Malaria, (Eds.: E. Casman, H. Dowlatabadi), Routledge, UK 
2002, pp. 292–328.
[22] C. I. Chandler, U. Beisel, Med Anthropol, 2017, 36, 411.
[23] D. McCoy, S. Chand, D. Sridhar, Health PolicyPlan. 2009, 24, 
407.
[24] a) J. G. Breman, M. S. Alilio, A. Mills, Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 
2004, 71, 1; b) N. White, F. Nosten, S. Looareesuwan, W. Watkins, 
K. Marsh, R. Snow, G. Kokwaro, J. Ouma, T. Hien, M. Molyneux, The 
Lancet 1999, 353, 1965; c) C. J. Whitty, M. Rowland, F. Sanderson, 
T. K. Mutabingwa, BMJ 2002, 325, 1221.
[25] D. Schellenberg, C. Menendez, E. Kahigwa, J. Aponte, J. Vidal, 
M. Tanner, H. Mshinda, P. Alonso, Lancet 2001, 357, 1471.
[26] The Lancet, The Lancet 2008, 372, 264.
Global Challenges 2018, 2, 1700077
www.advancedsciencenews.com
1700077 (10 of 10) © 2018 The Authors. Published by WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim
www.global-challenges.com
[27] T. P. Eisele, D. Larsen, R. W. Steketee, Int. J. Epidemiol. 2010, 
39 Suppl 1, i88.
[28] IPTi Consortium, Intermittent preventive treatment with antimalarial 
drugs delivered through the Expanded Programme of Immunisation: A 
new potential public health strategy to reduce the burden of malaria in 
young African children. A proposal to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foun-
dation from the IPTi Consortium, 2003.
[29] WHO, A WHO Policy Platform for Intermittent Preventive Treatment 
in Infants (IPTi). A proposal to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
Geneva 2005.
[30] WHO, Report of the Technical Consultation on Intermittent Preven-
tive Therapy in Infancy (IPTi), WHO Technical Expert Group, Geneva 
2006.
[31] WHO, Report of the Technical Expert Group (TEG) meeting on Inter-
mittent Preventive Therapy in Infancy (IPTi), WHO Technical Expert 
Group,Geneva 2007.
[32] Institute of Medicine, Assessment of the Role of Intermittent Preven-
tive Treatment for Malaria in Infants, The National Academies Press, 
Washington, DC 2008.
[33] WHO, Report of the Technical Consultation on Intermittent Preventive 
Treatment in Infants (IPTi), WHO Technical Expert Group, Geneva, 
2009.
[34] B. D’Souza, Strengthening policy setting processes at the World Health 
Organization Global Malaria Programme: An Analysis of the Driving 
Forces that Influence and Enable Organizational Change, LSHTM, 
UK 2014.
[35] B. J. D’Souza, R. D. Newman, Malar J 2012, 11, 28.
[36] B. Cisse, C. Sokhna, D. Boulanger, J. Milet, H. Ba el, K. Richardson, 
R. Hallett, C. Sutherland, K. Simondon, F. Simondon, N. Alexander, 
O. Gaye, G. Targett, J. Lines, B. Greenwood, J. F. Trape, Lancet 
2006, 367, 659.
[37] A. Bhasin, M. Cairns, B. J. D’Souza, in Seasonal Malaria Chemopre-
vention: from Evidence to Policy, LSHTM, Oxford, UK 2014.
[38] a) M. Cairns, A. Roca-Feltrer, T. Garske, A. L. Wilson, D. Diallo, 
P. J. Milligan, A. C. Ghani, B. M. Greenwood, Nat. Commun. 
2012, 3, 881; b) A. Dicko, A. I. Diallo, I. Tembine, Y. Dicko, 
N. Dara, Y. Sidibe, G. Santara, H. Diawara, T. Conaré, A. Djimde, 
PLoS Med. 2011, 8, e1000407; c) A. T. Konaté, J. B. Yaro, 
A. Z. Ouédraogo, A. Diarra, A. Gansané, I. Soulama, , D. T. Kangoyé, 
Y. Kaboré, E. Ouédraogo, A. Ouédraogo, PLoS Med. 2011, 8, 
e1000408.
[39] WHO, Report of the Technical Consultation on Seasonal Malaria 
Chemoprevention (SMC), WHO Technical Expert Group, Geneva 
2011.
[40] WHO, Seasonal Malaria Chemoprevention (formally known as Inter-
mittent Preventive Treatment in children) for preventing malaria 
morbidity in children aged less than 5 years living in areas of marked 
seasonal transmission: GRADE tables to assist guideline development 
and recommendations (2011), http://www.who.int/malaria/mpac/
feb2012/smc_grade_tables.pdf (accessed: April 2017).
[41] WHO IPTi Technical Expert Group, The Lancet 2008, 372, 1383.
[42] IPTi Consortium, Lancet Publication Briefing document - IPTi Con-
sortium - 17 Sep 2009, http://www.who.int/immunization/sage/4_
IPTi_Consortium_Briefing_doc_keymessages_QA_14Sep.pdf 
(accessed: May 2017).
[43] a) F. Manzi, J. Schellenberg, Y. Hamis, A. K. Mushi, K. Shirima, 
A. Mwita, A. Simba, N. Rusibamayila, M. Kitambi, M. Tanner, 
Trans. R. Soc. Trop. Med. Hyg. 2009, 103, 79; b) W. Maokola, 
M. Chemba, Y. Hamisi, M. Mrisho, K. Shirima, F. Manzi, 
M. Masanja, B. Willey, P. Alonso, H. Mshinda, Int. Health 2011, 3, 
154; c) R. Pool, A. Mushi, J. A. Schellenberg, M. Mrisho, P. Alonso, 
C. Montgomery, M. Tanner, H. Mshinda, D. Schellenberg, Malar. 
J. 2008, 7, 213; d) J. R. A. Schellenberg, K. Shirima, W. Maokola, 
F. Manzi, M. Mrisho, A. Mushi, H. Mshinda, P. Alonso, M. Tanner, 
D. M. Schellenberg, Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 2010, 82, 772.
[44] D. Chandramohan, S. Owusu-Agyei, I. Carneiro, T. Awine, 
K. Amponsa-Achiano, N. Mensah, S. Jaffar, R. Baiden, A. Hodgson, 
F. Binka, BMJ 2005, 331, 727.
[45] F. W. Scharpf, in Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Democratic 
Accountability in the EU, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna 2006.
[46] M. van Eeten, Sci. Public Policy 2001, 28, 423.
[47] a) V. Lowndes, M. Roberts, Why Institutions Matter, Palgrave, 
Basingstoke 2013; b) G. Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Sci-
ence, Continuum, London 2005.
[48] a) J. Cohen, Science 2002, 295, 2000; b) J. Cohen, Science 2006, 311, 
162; c) D. McCoy, G. Kembhavi, J. Patel, A. Luintel, The Lancet 2009, 
373, 1645; d) S. Okie, N. Engl. J. Med. 2006, 355, 1084; e) G. Targett, 
P. Alonso, F. Binka, F. Collins, B. Greenwood, J. Hemingway, F. ter 
Kuile, O. Sankoh, D. Schellenberg, The Lancet 2009, 373, 2195; 
f) D. Stuckler, S. Basu, M. McKee, PLOS Med. 2011, 8, e1001020.
[49] T. M. Brown, M. Cueto, E. Fee, Am. J. Public Health 2006, 96, 62.
[50] J. Eckl, Global Social Policy 2014, 14, 91.
Global Challenges 2018, 2, 1700077
